Much foreign direct investment (FDI) takes the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). It is commonplace in finance to view acquisitions as manifestations of the market for corporate control. Following on that insight we propose a model of FDI in which headquarters bid to control overseas assets. We derive an equation for bilateral FDI stocks that resembles the recently developed fixed effects approach to modelling bilateral trade flows. We estimate the model and use its parameters to construct benchmarks for evaluating multilateral inward and outward FDI.
Introduction
From 1987 to 2001, about two-thirds of foreign direct investment (FDI) took the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) rather than new plants. While it often makes sense to think of M&A and greenfield investments as alternatives in a "buy or build" decision, this need not be the primary consideration. For example, when Renault took a one third share of Nissan, it had not been contemplating building a Renault factory in Japan. There was no intention of shifting production of Renault models to Japanese factories. Instead, Renault installed one of its star managers, Carlos Ghosn, as the Nissan CEO. He proceeded to restructure the Japanese company, restoring it to profitability. This case illustrates the way that FDI can be a manifestation of an international market for corporate control. This paper develops a simple model of FDI where heterogeneous investors bid to obtain control rights on existing overseas assets. Unlike much of the existing theoretical literature predicting FDI, our formulation explicitly considers more than two countries. The model yields an equation for bilateral FDI that strongly resembles the gravity equation used to analyze bilateral trade in goods. The specification consists of an outward effect reflecting characteristics of the origin country, an inward effect reflecting characteristics of the destination country, and a vector of pair-specific variables reflecting monitoring costs. We estimate the model using a cross-section of 62 countries. In a second stage, we relate the estimated inward and outward fixed effects to variables predicted by the model. We then show how a formulation of the model can be aggregated to yield a simple expression for a country's share of world FDI. We compare predicted country-level inward and outward FDI shares to actual values to see how well the model fits multilateral data and identify countries with anomalous FDI performance.
The theoretical FDI literature has traditionally focussed on greenfield investment. Important early work includes Markusen's (1984) model of horizontal FDI and Helpman's (1984) model of vertical FDI. Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) solve a 47-equation, general equilibrium model incorporating vertical and horizontal FDI. Their computations suggest linear FDI equations where key variables enter with interactions to capture non-linearities in the model. Bergstrand and Egger (2004) add physical capital to Markusen's knowledge-capital model. They generate "theoretical flow data" and find the "frictionless" (no trade costs) gravity equation describes their simulated data well.
A smaller, but growing, literature considers FDI in the form of cross-border M&A. Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) distinguish M&A from greenfield by assuming that merged firms eliminate one of the varieties and the associated fixed costs of the joining firms. In common with horizontal greenfield investment, cross-border M&A becomes more attractive relative to exporting as trade costs increase. Neary (2004) also focuses on the market structure implications of M&A but explores the implications of cost asymmetries between acquiring and target firms. In his model low cost firms from one country acquire-and then shut down-high cost firms abroad. Nocke and Yeaple (2005a) posit M&A as providing access to a foreign firm's non-mobile capabilities. Firms choose different modes of foreign entry (export, greenfield and M&A) depending on their heterogeneous capabilities. Nocke and Yeaple (2005b) model international acquisitions as arising from a matching between heterogeneous entrepreneurs and varieties. All of these models abstract from one the main considerations of our paper: the frictions that inhibit cross-border ownership.
One natural way to model frictions affecting FDI is to assume that headquarters have imperfect information regarding assets in potential host countries. This approach has some precedents in the international finance literature. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) stipulate that international buyers have a lower opportunity cost of capital but face information asymmetries when they purchase domestic firms. In Razin and Goldstein (2005) and Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (1998) , foreign direct investors have informational advantages over portfolio investors.
Mody, Razin and Sadka (2004) and Loungani, Mody, Razin and Sadka (2003) propose that foreign investors have specialized knowledge that gives them an advantage over domestic owners. However, that advantage declines with greater corporate transparency in the host country. None of the papers associate information problems with geography. One paper that explicitly considers monitoring costs that are a function of distance is Marin and Schnitzer (2004) . That paper constructs and estimates a model of the headquarters decision to use its own funds to finance direct investment (internal financing) or to rely upon loans from local or international banks. This paper's contribution to the theory literature comes through an explicit model of monitoring in which we establish an ability versus proximity tradeoff. We build this into a highly stylized international market for corporate control. In our model, a country's likelihood of bidding successfully for assets in another country depends not only on the distance between the two countries, but also their location relative to bidders in other countries. This approach allows us to incorporate geography into an analytical expression for bilateral FDI in a multicountry world. Our model provides a set of micro-foundations for a gravity equation for FDI.
Other models may provide a different set of micro-foundations for the same equation.
1 Our purpose is not to test our model against possible alternatives. Rather, we offer an analytical structure on which to base estimation of bilateral FDI.
A growing empirical literature uses the gravity equation to investigate the determinants of various types of cross-border investments. The base gravity equation relates the log of bilateral investment to the logged sizes of origin and destination economies and the log distance between them. Studies on FDI have then augmented the gravity equation with variables such as factor endowments (Eaton and Tamura, 1994) , corruption and taxes (Wei, 2000) , third-country competition (Eichengreen and Tong, 2005) , information proxies (Loungani et al., 2003) , taxes and wages (Mutti and Grubert, 2004) , and institutions (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007 ). Hijzen, Gorg, and Manchin (2005) and di Giovanni (2005) investigate the determinants of bilateral M&A transactions in a gravity setting. Portes and Rey (2005) find that gravity models also fit portfolio investment flows.
Policy is often most interested in total FDI rather than geographic origins. Our multilateral benchmarks contribute to the identification of unusually high or low FDI performance.
1 Martin and Rey (2004) derive a gravity-type model for foreign portfolio investment assuming risk adverse investors and iceberg transaction costs for assets. Models of horizontal FDI predict that distance costs of trade would promote investment. However, if final goods were non-traded but required inputs from home, high trade costs could lead to the negative distance effect exhibited in the gravity equation (see Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl, 2003 , for a model that admits this possibility).
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) "FDI Performance Index" compares countries' shares of world FDI to shares of world GDP. Our theory identifies biases in the UNCTAD index and our empirical implementation shows that our benchmark generally achieves a tighter fit with actual FDI.
The next section presents the model and the corresponding specifications of bilateral and multilateral FDI. Section 3 describes OECD and UNCTAD data on FDI and M&A. Here we argue that a model of FDI as a market for corporate control may represent a large share of FDI. Section 4 describes the results for bilateral FDI and M&A. We proceed in two stages.
In the first stage, we use bilateral FDI for 62 OECD and partner countries to estimate origin and destination fixed effects. In the second stage, we estimate the unknown model parameters and investigate the empirical validity of the model's predictions. Section 5 uses the estimated parameters to predict country-level aggregate foreign investment for 172 countries. Then we compare the predictions to actual country-level shares of FDI & cross-border M&A. We summarize our methods and results in the final section.
The model
We develop a control-based model of FDI. Jensen and Ruback (1983) motivate this approach, arguing that "the market for corporate control is best viewed as an arena in which managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources." The model proceeds in three subsections. First, we specify the costs and benefits of controlling remote assets in a game between the headquarters of an MNE and a subsidiary. Second, we use discrete choice theory to solve for the expected amount of corporate assets in one country that will be controlled by a management team based in another country. This yields an expression for bilateral FDI stocks. Third, we specify the predictions of our model for a country's multilateral inward and outward FDI.
The costs of remote control
We present a simple model that introduces a trade-off between the benefit of shifting control to a better owner and the costs of having that owner be remote from the target. Without monitoring, the manager of the subsidiary lacks incentives to exert effort to maximize the value of the subsidiary. Monitoring requires costs that are increasing in distance between the head office and its subsidiary.
We adapt the model from the "inspection game" described in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 17) and apply it to the case of a headquarters management team (hereafter, HQ) that must monitor the managers at an overseas subsidiary (hereafter, Sub). Sub chooses whether to work or shirk. Gross profits depend on the contributions of HQ and Sub. HQ always adds a whereas Sub adds b only when choosing to exert effort. HQ simultaneously chooses whether to trust Sub or verify whether it has worked or not.
Payoffs for Sub and HQ are shown in Table 1 . HQ pays w to Sub unless HQ inspects and discovers shirking in which case Sub gets zero. Working generates gross output of a + b but Sub incurs cost of effort, e. Verification costs HQ c, which we will later assume to be an increasing function of distance from HQ to Sub. there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. If Sub expects HQ to trust, it will want to shirk since this delivers the same compensation but saves e. But if HQ expects Sub to shirk, it will want to verify, since the cost of verifying is less than the wage (c < w). In that case, Sub would rather work, since w − e > 0.
In a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, Sub shirks with probability x and HQ verifies with probability y. By assumption, HQ's value-added does not depend on Sub's action. Expected revenues are therefore given by a + b(1 − x). HQ compensates Sub unless HQ verifies that shirking occurred (probability xy). Taking these observations into account, HQ's expected payoff is
Sub's expected utility is w(1 − xy) − e(1 − x). The agents choose their respective probabilities taking the other's as given. The first order condition for HQ is therefore v y = −c + wx = 0
and that for Sub is v x = −wy + e = 0. The equilibrium mixing probabilities are therefore x = c/w and y = e/w. Plugging these results back into HQ's payoff, we obtain
Maximizing this expression with respect to w implies the contract of paying w = √ bc except when HQ verifies that shirking has occurred (and therefore pays nothing). Substituting this result back into equation (2), we see that
The key result is that higher verification costs lower the value of the subsidiary to headquarters.
This effect is magnified when Sub's effort is more valuable (high b). Put another way, if two head offices of equal potential valued-added a were bidding, the one with lower inspection costs would bid higher.
We now give the model empirical content by hypothesizing that inspection costs, c, are an increasing function of a vector of geographic and cultural distance measures denoted, D in .
We call this the remoteness function and specify it so as to simplify the algebra of the value equation. In particular, let
Substituting back into equation 3 in country n to a representative HQ in country i, we have
This equation illustrates an ability versus proximity trade-off, since high values of HQ valueadded a are necessary to offset the monitoring costs of a remote subsidiary. There are two other implications of the model worth noting even though we cannot test them here. First, the compensation paid to Sub is an increasing function of distance given by
Second, the output of the subsidiary is decreasing in distance from HQ:
In both relationships, the impact of remoteness is higher when Sub adds greater value, b.
The simple model captures the idea that once monitoring costs are taken into account, a high-ability headquarters may have a lower willingness to pay for a target than a less able, but more proximate headquarters. Intuitively, we would expect to find the lower valuations of remote HQs reflected in lower amounts of realized investment. The next subsection formalizes that intuition.
Bilateral ownership stocks
We endogenize the ownership outcome by modeling it as a process in which the bidder who anticipates the highest subsidiary valuation, v, makes the highest bid, and wins the stylized auction for control of a subsidiary.
2 Let π in denote the probability that a headquarters from country i takes control of a randomly drawn target in country n. Using K n to represent the asset value of the entire stock of targets in the host country, expected bilateral FDI stocks are 2 The official definition of FDI includes minority share-holding, as long as there is a "lasting interest" involving "a significant degree of influence," operationalized as an equity share of 10% or more. For brevity, we apply the term "control" to all FDI.
given by
Unless there are a continuum of targets in country n, actual FDI will differ from expected FDI due to "lumpiness." Since many targets are very large, realized F in can be very different from the expected level. An illustration of lumpiness can be seen in Renault's $5.4 billion investment in Nissan in 1999. That year France's stock of FDI in Japan jumped by a factor of 10, and Renault's investment accounted for 95% of the net inflow. In Appendix A we specify the variance of F in as a function of the number and size distribution of the targets in the host country.
To specify π in , we suppose that country i has m i headquarters, each of which have different valuations for a given target in country n. The natural way to introduce heterogeneity in the valuations is through the HQ value-added term, a, which enters equation 4 additively. For reasons stated below, we assume that the cumulative density of a takes the Gumbel (type-I extreme value) form: exp(− exp(−(x−µ)/σ)). Bury (1999) points out that the maximum of m Gumbel draws is also Gumbel with the same shape parameter, σ, but the location parameter, µ, shifted up by σ ln m. This property is useful since π in depends on the maximum of the m i bids issuing from country i. The probability that the highest bidder for a random target in country n is one of the HQs from country i equals the probability that the maximum valuation from country i exceeds the maximum valuation from any other country. Here a second feature of Gumbel heterogeneity comes in useful: it is a rare case where the distribution of the probability that a given draw is the maximum draw takes a simple analytical form.
Using the results of Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992, p. 39) , one can then show that the π in are given by the multinomial logit formula:
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Substituting (6) into (5), we can express expected bilateral FDI stocks as
To obtain an equation that can be estimated, we need to parameterize the inspection cost function r(). With the goal of linearity in parameters, let r(
is a compound parameter that determines the FDI-impeding effect of distance. It depends positively on the distance costs of remote inspections (δ) and the value-added by a non-shirking manager (b). On the other hand, the higher the heterogeneity in bidder ability (captured with σ), the less distance inhibits FDI.
Expected F in depends only on the shares of headquarters in each country, so we introduce
to represent a country's share of the world's bidders. Using the new notation we can specify an important factor in the bilateral FDI equation that follows from the theory.
as the "bid competition" for targets in country n. Bid competition is greater when large shares of bidders are nearby (low D j ) and high ability (high µ ). Re-expression of (7) in terms of these variables yields
This expression resembles the gravity equation in that expected bilateral stocks are increasing in the product of origin and destination size variables (s m i and K n ) and decreasing in measures of bilateral distance. Higher bid competition (B n ) in n implies that a higher fraction of assets in n will be taken by rivals from other countries, thereby reducing the expected bilateral stocks of headquarters from country i.
Equation (8) specifies the country i's expected stock of direct investment in host country n. Our static model does not predict the sequence of FDI flows involved in reaching this expected stock. Observed FDI flows include divestitures that often lead to negative bilateral investment. A model of flows requires accounting for divestitures of assets in a specification of the adjustment costs associated with convergence to desired FDI levels.
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Additional insight into how the parameters of the model might be estimated can be had by re-expressing the right-hand side as:
Outward effect
This equation shows that bilateral FDI can be separated into a origin i-specific term relating to its share of the world's headquarters and their mean ability, a destination n-specific term relating to the share of "target" assets and the competing set of bidders (B n ). 4 These outward and inward effects can be estimated as i-and n-specific fixed effects. Compressing the outward and inward effects into one term each, we obtain an even more compact expression for expected bilateral FDI stocks:
where
is the inward direct investment effect for destination n. This formulation follows Kortum (2001, 2002) and Redding and Venables (2004) who estimate trade equations with exporter and importer fixed effects. Like Eaton and Kortum (2002) , we wish to explore the structural determinants of the fixed effects. First, however, we manipulate the model to achieve expressions for expected multilateral outward and inward FDI. These expressions can be used for benchmarking purposes.
Implications for multilateral FDI
UNCTAD calculates its FDI Performance Index as the ratio of a country's share of world FDI to its share of world GDP. In this section, we aggregate bilateral FDI to derive predictions for multilateral FDI in the context of our model. We show that even the simplest formulation of the model-one with no distance costs-generates predictions of a country's share of world FDI that differ from the one used by UNCTAD.
Summing across bidders for a given destination country, we obtain expected worldwide (w) foreign direct investment received by country n:
The summation across i = n arises because the "F" in FDI excludes investment by domestic bidders in domestic targets (which equals π nn K n ). Worldwide FDI stocks are found by summing the national inward stocks:
The amount of total outward investment by country i is given by
A comparison of multilateral inward and outward investment for a given country i suggests an interpretation for the A i term. Outward investment, F iw , equals inward investment, F wi , if and only if A i = 1. Thus, A i is a measure of the "bidder advantage" for country i when A i > 1 and "bidder disadvantage" when A i < 1.
The equations above result simply from adding up accounting identities. Equations (5) and (8) imply that
is the domestically owned share of domestic assets. Letting s
of the world's capital in country i, bidder advantage is given by
The inward FDI benchmark is given by the predicted value of i's share of world inward FDI stock:
n is the share of the world's capital stock held by domestic controllers.
The outward FDI benchmark is given by the predicted value of i's share of world outward FDI stock:
Consider the case of no distance costs, θ = 0, and that each country's shares of bidders and targets are proportional to its GDP share, s
shares equal predicted inwards shares,
where Despite these definitional differences, it is useful to observe the relationship between the two data series. We collected multilateral FDI flow and M&A data from UNCTAD's Foreign 5 www.geneva.ch/_FDI_performance.htm 6 The M&A data are based on the acquirer obtaining at least a 10% stake in the target company. 7 These definitional issues are discussed in the World Investment Report 2000, Chapter IV, pp.104-109. non-OECD countries listed as "partners" in the OECD database for which we have data on bilateral FDI and GDP.
8 The third group consists of an additional 122 countries for which UNCTAD provides multilateral data. Table 2 The correlations are around 0.5 for the other groups.
We have learned that M&A seems to characterize much of the FDI of OECD countries. 
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We estimate the model in two stages. In the first stage, we regress bilateral FDI stocks on outward and inward fixed effects and a vector of geographic and cultural distance measures,
In the second stage, we regress the estimated outward and inward effects on variables predicted by the model. Specifically, the outward effect is a function of the quality and quantity of management teams (µ i /σ + ln s m i ) whereas the inward effect depends on a country's capital 10 We thereby discard 511 observations with positive M&A data. However, M&A levels for these observations are quite small: only two exceed $10 billion with both of those involving Bermuda as the destination country. stock (K n ) and bid competition (B n ).
To proceed, we need to move from the expected values determined in the theory section to the actual values of FDI recorded in the OECD data set. Define η in = F in /E[F in ] as the ratio of actual to expected bilateral FDI stocks. Using equation (10),
Although η in has an expected value of one, it can deviate from one for three main reasons.
First, in the context, of the model, lumpiness of the targets leads to variance in realized FDI (see appendix A). Second, specification error is nearly unavoidable in a parsimonious model based on particular functional forms. Third, governments measure FDI imperfectly.
The D in vector consists of log distance and adjustments based on observed and unobserved bilateral linkages:
where d in is the average great circle distance between the 20 largest cities in countries i and n.
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Lang in indicates that i and n share a common language. A prior colonial relationship is likely to be a good proxy for institutional similarity that could facilitate monitoring. We introduce directional dummy variables to indicate FDI to a former colony from its colonizer (ToColy) and FDI from a colony to its colonizer (FromColy). The distance, language, and colony variables are provided on the cepii.fr website. These variables have been found significant in past studies of trade (e.g. Rose, 2004) . We introduce u in to capture all the unobserved linkages between two countries that affect the cost of monitoring. After introducing these variables, the equation for bilateral FDI stocks becomes
11 We experimented with dividing distance into six categories and using category dummy variables as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) but found that the parsimonious linear-in-logs approach provides a slightly better fit. The two distance decay functions are compared graphically in files available at http://strategy.sauder. ubc.ca/head/sup.
The conventional method for estimating (16) is to take logs of both sides, yielding
FromColy in , and in ≡ θ 5 u in + ln η in . We can then estimate the parameters (O i , I n , θ 1 -θ 4 ) using linear regression. Since u in captures unobserved country-pair linkages,
we expect in to be high correlated with the reverse direction error term ni . We therefore estimate (17) using pair-wise random effects (GLS).
A well-known problem with estimating (17) is the log function eliminates all the zeros.
This problem is more severe for FDI and cross-border M&A than trade because of the much higher frequency of bilateral zero stocks. Eaton and Tamura (1994) Comparing with the least squares first order conditions,
we see that the former involves level deviations of F in from its expected value whereas the OLS involves log deviations. In comparing the fit of each model to the data, we therefore report diagnostics (R 2 and RMSE) in terms of both levels and logs. Another advantage of
Poisson QMLE is that it can incorporate the zero FDI stocks. Note that number of M&A observations in the Poisson QMLE regressions is much higher than corresponding FDI regressions-2465 M&A observations versus 1559 FDI observations. This is due to recorded zeros in the M&A regressions for observations where the OECD lists FDI as missing (recall, di Giovanni generated zeros when no M&A was observed). We find that the Poisson results are remarkably robust to the treatment of zeros and missing values-they hardly change when we turn zeros into "missings" and "missings" into zeros.
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We use the full-sample as the basis for our second-stage estimations to maximize the number of estimated outward and inward effects. We consider the Poisson QMLE results to be the preferred specification for our second stage regressions. Appendix B lists the estimated first-stage fixed effects used in the second stage regressions. The number of observations is never the full 62 across specification due to missing data and other issues detailed in the appendix.
The outward effect depends on country i's share of world bidders and the quality of the bidders, µ i /σ. We assume the number of bidders, m i , is proportional to population, denoted N i , and that bidder quality can be represented by per capita GDP, denoted y i . Thus, the outward fixed effect comprises scale (N i ) and development (y i ) effects:
We estimateÔ
whereÔ i is the estimated fixed effect from the first stage Poisson QMLE regression, C is a constant, and e i is the second-stage error term. We match 2001 population and per-capita income for FDI fixed effect regressions and 1999 population and per-capita income to the M&A fixed effect regressions.
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The first two columns of Table 4 contain results for FDI and M&A. In both specifications, the coefficient on ln N i is insignificantly different from one, indicating that, after controlling for the level of development, the number of bidders is proportional to the size of the population.
The strong effect of income per capita can be interpreted as capturing the average ability effect embodied in the model as µ i . We can also interpret the results as the number of bidders being proportional to GDP, ln(N i y i ). In that case, the coefficients on development become To examine the determinants of the inward effect, I n = ln K n − lnB n , we computeB n = and development, ln y, variables. We observed that both are significant with elasticities close to one and explain 93% of the variation in log capital stocks (ln K).
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We therefore use scale and development as proxies for capital and fit the following regression to our FDI and M&A inwards effects:
The results are displayed in columns (4) and (5). Our theoretical model predicts that the coefficients on the capital stock and bid competition will enter with unitary elasticity.
Thus, given the column (3) results, the proxies for capital stock, ln N n and ln y n , should obtain coefficients of 1.022 and .964. As can be observed, per capita income is entering more strongly that what our theory predicts. A joint test of these restrictions along with unitary elasticity for ln B n is rejected at the 1% significance level.
Our parsimonious model posits no barriers to inward FDI other than monitoring costs as proxied by distance, common language, and colonial ties. Of course, other country characteristics will influence inward investment such as differences in institutions. Rossi and Volpin (2001) use country institution data in La Porta et al. (1998) and find that the presence of common law and high accounting standards and shareholder protection are associated with greater M&A. We collected data on "rule of law" as reported by the World Bank for our sample of countries and, in unreported regressions, add this variable to our inward effects regressions. It enters positively with borderline significance in the FDI and M&A regressions and lowers the coefficient on per capita income (the correlation between rule of law and per capita GDP is 0.88). With the inclusion of this variable, we now are unable to reject the unitary elasticity for the (proxied) capital stock and bid competition variables at the 10% level.
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The results of the bilateral regressions provide support for the gravity specification for FDI implied by our model of corporate control. Second-stage regressions using the estimated outward effects show a strong effect of per capita income, highlighting the importance of source country development for outward FDI. Investigation of the determinants of the inward effect reveals that the proxies for capital shares enter with the expected unit elasticity. For reasons outside the model, however, the level of development also exerts a positive influence on the inward effect. This finding suggests that the inclusion of additional variables that describe the investment climate may capture variation in the inward effect beyond what is explained by the model-based determinants. Our derivation shows that additional host-country variables should be estimated via the two-step procedure outlined here.
Multilateral FDI results
In this section we show that our parsimonious, structural model conforms to the principal patterns of aggregate FDI and M&A data. To do this, we apply the model and estimates from the bilateral regressions to predict each country's shares of world outward and inward Recall the specification on inward and outward shares:
Since a country's success at bidding for assets depends on its characteristics and geographic location as well as those of all other countries, it is necessary to use information on all countries in the world. We adhere to the theoretical structure of the model and use estimates of unknown model parameters from the bilateral regression. n , and distance from other countries as D in θ. We compute B n as described We refer to our model predictions as the "estimated" benchmark which we compare to two other benchmarks. The UNCTAD benchmark predicts FDI shares equalling GDP shares, s i , as implied by UNCTAD's FDI Performance Index. The neutral benchmark assumes bidder and target shares are proportional to GDP and there are no distance effects. As shown earlier, in this case, FDI shares are related to GDP shares except that there is an adjustment for relative country size. Table 5 reports mean absolute deviations of the difference between each benchmark and the actual shares for each country. We examine both level and log differences. In terms of levels, the fit of the predictions to United States data dominates the results as the US is such a dominant source and recipient of FDI, accounting for 22% of outward stocks and 21% of The estimated benchmark outperforms the UNCTAD benchmark in seven out of the eight measures. The lone exception for differences in logs of inward investment for all countries.
The neutral benchmark also fits actual data better than the UNCTAD benchmark. The estimated benchmark provides a superior fit relative to the other two for outward investment, particularly when we computed deviations in terms of differences in logs. This is because our model conditions outward investment on the quality of bidders as measured by per capita GDP. However, the estimated benchmark over-predicts the United States share of outward investment-37% of world outward stocks as compared to actual outward shares of 22%. This is a consequence of the high US share of world GDP, 32%, and the importance that the estimated benchmark ascribes to high per capita income (bidder quality). With regard to inward investment, Japan, India, and Iran under perform relative to the benchmark whereas Hong Kong, Singapore, Ireland, Belgium-Luxembourg, and the Netherlands over-perform.
21 For outward investment, Figure 2 shows the data points well dispersed around the 45-degree line with the largest (log) deviations exhibited by small countries. 
Conclusion
We develop a model explaining foreign direct investment based on an international market for corporate control. After controlling for geographic and cultural distance effects between bilateral partners, FDI depends on origin-country effects (outward effects) and destinationcountry effects (inward effects). The latter includes a "bid competition" term that reflects characteristics of competing countries. Our model highlights the importance of taking into account the influence of third-country effects in bilateral estimation, thus echoing the insight of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for the application of the gravity equation to bilateral trade.
We use bilateral FDI data for 30 OECD countries and 32 partner countries to estimate the unknown parameters and test predictions of the model. We find that proxies for countries' shares of bidders and targets enter as predicted. Moreover, we find that the level of development of the source country exerts a strong, positive influence on outward FDI.
Applying our model and estimates from bilateral regressions, we calculate predicted inward and outward shares of world FDI for all countries in 2001 and compare them to actual values.
We find that the model fits the data fairly well. Indeed, the good fit even for countries where M&A is relatively unimportant suggests that an analytical derivation of a gravity equation for greenfield investment with frictions would be a helpful complement to this model.
Our empirical model of bilateral FDI intentionally uses a very small number of explanatory variables that we can incorporate within a structural model. We do this partly to investigate how well a parsimonious model can account for the global pattern of FDI and also to facilitate calculation of the multilateral benchmarks for the largest set of countries and periods. One can use the structural model as a baseline to identify deviations and then introduce additional covariates to improve the fit or evaluate the impact of policies on FDI.
and Taiwan plus our decision to drop the five countries for which we estimated fixed effects even though all bilateral M&A purchases were recorded as zero-United Arab Emirates, Iran, Slovenia, Iceland, and Cost Rica. We do not report the estimated fixed effects for these latter countries but they are much larger in absolute value than those for countries with some positive FDI purchases (estimates of less than -25). When we include these five countries, the standard error increases dramatically. Kuwait had only zero levels of bilateral inward FDI and we exclude it in the second-stage inward FDI regression. Inward M&A regressions have 56 observations because of missing GDP data for Netherlands Antilles, no M&A data for Kuwait, Luxembourg, and Taiwan and dropping Libya and Iran because they received no inward FDI. 
